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A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage has to live 
in even worse conditions while he is re-building it and 
making a decent house for himself.
- President Julius Nyerere
But it is surely better to make relevant bu t subjective 




- President Julius Nyerere
I
2Situation, Goals, Performance: An Introductory Sketch
Tanzania is a very large territory in respect to geographic size 
(about 950,000 square kilometres land area); a moderate sized polity 
in respect to population (approaching 19 million in 1980); a very 
poor economy (about £250 per capita and £4 billion overall at the 
official exchange rates in 197 9) .
Tanzania is one of the "least developed economies" albeit at the upper
end of that range with the manufacturing sector contribution of the
order of 10% of GDP and adult literacy near 70%. In 1974 it was
"ranked" third in the list of "most severely affected" economies and
over 1979-81 was buffeted by exogenous shocks of greater aggregate
magnitude than those of 1973-74. In the earlier case the shocks
were primarily related to bad weather drastically affecting food
import requirements, secondarily to oil price increases and tertiarily
to rapid growth in other import prices and a halt to increases in
3real per capita soft resource transfers (aid). In the past few years 
the 1979-80 oil price increases, the 1978 invasion of Tanzania by 
Iddi Amin and consequential liberation war and security support4expenses in Uganda, 1979-81 poor weather exacerbated by disastrously 
bad storage of 1976-78 food crop surpluses and the 1978-81 coffee 
price collapse were the major shocks.
As of the end of 1981 the economy was characterised by extreme external 
imbalance (exports of the order of 50% of imports, arrears of commercial
2payments in excess of $300 million, negligible gross foreign 
exchange reserves) rapid inflation (probably in the 30-35% range 
in both 1980 and 1981), substantial recurrent budget deficits 
(nearly 5% of GDP in 1979-80 and perhaps 3.5 to 4% in 1980/81), 
massive under-utilisation of capacity (eg. industrial sector out­
put to capacity ratio down from the 65.70% range in 1977 to 
most 35% in 1981, and the backlog of unprocureable, unprocessable 
or unshippable exports related to transport and processing bottle­
necks by the end of 1980 in excess of a quarter of actual 1980
5visible exports , although 1981 export performance suggests some 
subsequent improvement).
Political Economic Goals and Strategic Approaches
Tanzania has had a political economic strategy with relatively
clearly identified goals and instruments and an evolutional (rather
6than sharply changing) pattern since 1967. It can be presented 
under four main items: overcoming poverty and approaching equality; 
economic restructuring; participation and public sector leadership; 
growth and balance.
Overcoming Poverty/Approaching Equality comprises:
a. increasing productive employment and self-employment with 
the emphasis on investment in these sectors and in supporting 
infrastructure;
b. provision of basic services with universality to be achieved 
within a finite time period;
c. reduction of inequalities in wages and salaries, by region; 
urban/rural, and general;
d. increasing control over/reduction of opportunities for
3exploitation, eg. nationalisation of rental housing, wage- 
salary-wokring condition controls, workers and village 
councils, investment and surplus use allocation.
Economic restructuring comprises:
a. increasing national economic integration through increasing
the range of goods produced and the completeness of vectoral
7linkages from raw materials through finished products 
primarily by public sector investment, acquisition of tech­
nology/personnel, price incentives;
b. thereby balancing domestic production and use of goods by
broad sectors^;
c. reduction and diversification of external economic dependence
partly by reducing the ncessary ration of imports to GDP and
partly by increasing control over production and external 
trade;
9d. seeking to develop effective economic regionalism and
South-South economic cooperation at operational and negotia­
ting levels.
Participation and Public Sector Leadership comprises:
a. planned intervention;
b. emphasis on managed market plus public investment instruments
with substantial decentralisation and no serious commitment
to material balances planning/phys cal directives except in
respect to a limited number of scarce resources and/or 
10emergencies;
c. broadened participation in decision taking and implementation
focused on village and workers council, party and government 
bodies.
4Growth and Balance include:
a. substantial growth of real GNP - in principle"'"'*' at about 6%
per annum;
b. expansion of domestic savings toward 20% and net external 
transfers toward 10% of GDP to allow an investment ratio of 
at least 25%;
c. limited price increases;
d. a goods and services account import deficit financeable out
of concessional tranfer, World Bank loans and specific 
project related finance in normal years and these plus IMF 
low conditionality facilities in external shock years.
Tanzania has pursued these goals by what might be described as a
sequential, unbalanced approach. At any one time resource alloca­
tion is focused on a limited number of problems believed to be 
soluble at that time. Subsequently the effects of this concen­
tration create or make soluble other problems leading to an altera­
tion of allocations, which over time may lead to a more balanced 
trend than at any one one point in time.
This approach places emphasis on pushing the possibility frontier
outward. In principle it is paralleled by concentration on 
approaching closer to the attainable frontier in areas in which 
structural changes have been achieved. On occasion the two over­
lap, eg. 19bO-81 emphasis on restoring rationality among agricul­
tural prices raising them at least as rapidly as the cost of 
living was a macro or structural priority but also, arguably, a 
micro-efficiency o n e . ^
In practice this approach has led to sustained lacunae in respect 
to two critical areas neither subject to handling by secondary 
allocations on an incremental basis nor particularly suitable for
5once for all structural shifts: development of export earnings and of 
basic food storage capacity. These gaps have had, and continue to 
have, disastrous consequences, even though the former has become an 
identified priority area.
Tanzania has overtly denied that in its context there is any clear
evidence of a tradeoff between growth and equality but equally
indicated that subject to a growth performance adequate to sustain the
13strategy, some loss was acceptable. When the option has existed
tradeoffs between consumption and investment have tended to be biased
heavily toward the latter, subject to attempts to maintain real
minimum wage and peasant incomes. In principle a relatively austere
14view has been taken in respect to restraining inflation albeit not 
in the direct Philips Curve context which is structurally inapplicable 
to Tanzanian data.
Performance
Performance is marked by a definite periodicity: 1967-69 was relative 
favourable; 1970-72 was marked by a endogenously generated (and 
reversed) bank credit/external reserve crisis; 1973 was again 
relatively favourable on the face of it; 1974-76 was characterised 
by a major set of shocks and their overcoming; 1977-79 was marked by 
a more lax policy than before or since and a sharp deterioration of 
the underlying position while 1980-81 has been a period of - thus 
far only very partially successful - crises containment with a view 
to crisis management and recovery.
Productive employment including self employment has grown about as
rapidly as population - wage employment distinctly faster - and 
15unemployment remained relatively low-(8-10% urban). To 1974 real 
incomes of wage earners rose - those of salary earners probably were 
static with promotions affecting inflationary erosion of basically 
static scales. Thereafter, real wages fell - sharply to 1980 and 
1981 but relatively little in these years because of minimum and 
consequential wage increases. "Urban informal" trends probably 
paralled minimum wages. Salaries fell sharply with the rate slov/ed, 
but not halted by a 20% effective increase in 1981. Increased employ­
ment in the public sector has, in practice, been financed by reducing 
purchasing.
Peasant household real incomes (on average about 2/3 that of minimum
6prices deflated by cost of living (which have fluctuated with no trend
frcm 1967 and in 1980 were 5% above 1975) and crop (with staple foods
on balance doing better than export/industrial crops). The peak was
probably in 1977 or 1978/ since 1979-81 domestic terms of trade have
17come in relatively poor crop years.
Service provision has improved radically (eg. 5% rural access improved 
pure water in 1961, nearly 50% in 1981; 20% to 90% primary school 
enrollment) with particular gains for rural residents (who had least 
initially) and women (who benefit disproportionately from, approach to 
universaliity in education and from improved access to water).
Regional production and service inequalities have been reduced par­
tially and unevenly, and some secondary towns' position has been
18strengthened/preserved vis a vis Dar es Salaam, In both respects 
this represents "evening up" and not "cutting down". The tax incidence 
seems to be relatively progressive because basic foods are sales tax 
exempt and amenities relatively highly taxed.
Control of exploitation worked to a degree to 1979 - since then general
economic decline has created opportunities for "entrepreneurs of
adversity" in housing and goods and in extorting bribes for public
service provision. Surprisingly both rent control and price manage- 
19ment designed to manage moderate and/or temporary shortages continue 
to have some impact under conditions for which they were not designed.
On balance intra urban and urban/rural income distribution has
20become less unequal since 1967. Intra-rural change is less clear. 
Service distribution has become more equal. However, since 1977 (and 
since 1974 for the urban population) this has been in the context of 
falling average real purchasing power and from 1979/80 of at best 
static per capita real public services.
Economic restructuring has been substantial. Almost all consumer 
goods - except cars, light bulbs and refrigerators - used in Tanzania 
can now be produced there and the direct (inputs, spares) import con­
tent of the industrial sector is down to 20%. Substantial progress
has been made in respect to intermediate goods and construction
21materials and a quite limited but real base in capital goods.
Similarly in respect to food imports, dependence has been reduced on the 
production side albeit failure to develop storage adequate to serve a
715% urban population (3 to 5% in 1961) and to handle reserves co cope
2 2witn multi-year good and oad narvesc cycles has limited the value of 
tnis achievement.
import dependence for goods (and especially investment goods) has not 
been reduced. Rising proportions of fixed investment (and machinery 
within it) and of industry which have higher import ratios than 
agriculture and non-transport services combined with negative terms 
of trade shifts have meant that all the running Tanzania could do left 
it in the same macro-ratio position. expatriates have aeciined from 
90% (4,500) to perhaps 20% (4,000) of high level personpower over 
1961-81, but remain very high in respect to each novel undertaking 
or function in its initial years.
External dependence has certainly been diversified - there is no 
dominant trading partner or source of resource transfers. However, 
with exports falling from over 100% of imports in 1966 to under 45% 
in 1980 (a trend arguably correct to 1973 as an export surplus for a 
developing country is hardly optimal but thereafter exacerbated by 
terms of trade shifts and continued export decline temporarily masked 
by the 1976-77 beverage prices boom) and still only marginally above 
50% in 1981,external dependence has clearly increased and now applies 
to basic economy operation as well as to fixed investment.
Regional and South-South coordination has progressed erratically. The
results and potential are not insignificant but their size ana time
scale mean that they are more relevant to averting or limiting crises
23in the 1990's than to overcoming the present one.
Planning and managed market intervention has operated with mixed 
efficiency. Until 1981 its chief macro weakness was a failure to 
prioretise exports (a reversal over 1980 and 1981 was paralleled by and 
in part caused a nominal increase of the order of 40%). Micro 
efficiency has varied both in government and in parascatals with one 
(National Milling) a combined Chryster/Penncentral and two others 
(National Bank of Commerce, Tanzania Petroleum Development Cooperation) 
having profits equal to NMC losses and a substantial claim to real 
efficiency in resource use and service provision under severe 
handicaps.
Decentralisation and participation have had mixed but on balance
8positive macro and micro efficiency results. However, this does not
24hold tor regional and districc parastatals which unlike villages 
present a nearly unbroken vista of financial and physical inefficiency 
(and as a result have been radically downgraded).
Growth through 1979 (from 1963 or 1967) averaged just under 5%.
However, terms of trade deterioration (1961-71, 1973-75, 1977-81) has 
been very severe, reducing the "real purchasing power" growth to perhaps 
4% versus population growth of perhaps 3%.2^From 1977 terms of trade 
deterioration, forced reallocation of resources to defence and abnormal 
waste of food through inadequate storage have reduced per capita real 
consumption power perhaps 15% - little on public services and housing, 
about 5% on food, perhaps 30% on manufactured consumer goods and 
private services.
Saving which had approached 20% at the beginning of the 1970's fell 
sharply over 1974-76 and again after 1977 because ex post only one third 
of fixed investment can be financed from domestic real imports and 
earned foreign exchange was barely or not available above "operating 
inputs" over 1974-76 and 1977-81. Real foreign resource transfers on 
concessional and quasi-concessional terms have approached 10% in the 
early 1970's and over 1979-81 but in a context of crisis and of total 
foreign exchange availability inadequate to allow maintenance and2 g
operation of existing capacity or to prevent a build-up of commercial 
payment arrears. Low conditionality IMF facilities have been fully 
utilised.
Except for a deliberate structural adjustment to 1973-74 changes in 
world oil and grain prices, Tanzania prices rose by less than import 
prices until 1979. Over 1979-81 the inflation rate skyrocketed from 
perhaps 8% to over 30% , (albeit apparently not significantly above 
the African average and below that for developing countries). This 
relates directly to inability to utilise existing capacity because 
of import strangulation.
9II
Tanzania and the IMF
Prior to 1974 Tanzania made no use of Fund facilities. Fund missions' 
advice therefore was precisely that - indeed it was viewed as advice 
from a conservative, rather academic research body which might be of 
use in identifying weaknesses in Tanzanian policy implementation, 
albeit its political economic ideology posited means which were often 
unacceptable. Since Tanzania maintained a recurrent budget surplus 
and - except for a brief period in 1970-72 - relatively low rates of 
growth of domestic credit formation as well as fairly adequate 
reserve levels and current account deficits of about 5% of GDP fairly 
readily financed by concessional transfers, the IMF missions,while 
somewhat quizzical, were not sharply critical.
Over 1974-75/1976-77 Tanzania utilised its SDR's, "gold tranche", first 
credit tranche, oil facility and compensatory facility drawings and 
trust fund credits totalling about £75 million or 7% of total external 
resource transfers over the period (but about 17.5% in 1974-75).
These were all low conditionality facilities available on demonstration 
of a balance of payments pressures, substantial exogenous shock contri­
butions to those pressures and plausible programmes of import compression 
(including dcf control) and selective production increases toward 
restoring balance. A 10% devaluation in 1975 was the successor to 
earlier ones designed to facilitate domestic price adjustments 
(particularly grower prices) and/or avoid revaluation against major
trading partners rather more than an IMF condition or an attempt to
2 8use devaluation to alter the external balance.
Over 1975-76, negotiations toward a second credit tranche drawing failed
- or more accurately petered out early in 1977 when the impact of the
beverage boom (and the lagged response of concessional finance sources
to the mid-1974 requests) set reserves on an upward course to almost
five mpnths imports at the end of the year. The difference turned on
appropriate dcf ceilings with Tanzania arguing that the proposed IMF
trigger level would abort sustained recovery of real output by pre-
29venting adequate productive sector working capital expansion.
1977-78 were marked by relatively relaxed relations, but also by IMF 
(and IBRD) advice to relax foreign exchange budgeting (import allocations 
by category and major user). These were adopted in 1977 as the beverage
27
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boom began to receed and maintained through much of 1978 as the 
external balance turned sharply negative.
In early 1979 an interim programme was agreed involving use of the
balance of the first credit tranche, compensatory facility drawings
and trust fund resources. It included a devaluation of about an
eighth and a set of intended targets. As the explosive evolution of
oil prices was not foreseen and the war related deficit quite un- 
31guessable, it is hardly surprising that none of the targets were met,
nor that that the devaluation was viewed by some Tanzanians (with scant 
3 2evidence ) as a substantial contributory cause to inflation (which 
rose from 8-10% to over 20% by the year's end) and to negative changes 
in low wage worker and peasant purchasing power.
An attempt to negotiate a major programme led to a sharp breakdown 
in the fall of 1979. The programme proposed was a fairly standard one 
involving a substantial devaluation, a nominal wage freeze, abolition 
of price management, higher interest rates, reduction of real govern­
ment expenditure (at least implicitly centred on health, primary
33education and water ) and relaxation of import controls. It was 
clearly unacceptable to Tanzania, but the breakdown's timing and 
acerbity did not relate primarily to that as further negotiations 
would normally have ensued. Rather three complicaing factors gave 
the appearance of an IMF intent to put up a "take it or leave it" 
package including dismantling several key economic management tools, 
sharply worsening income distribution and reversing extension of basic 
services:
a. substantial disagreement existed within Tanzanian official and 
decision-taking circles;
b. proponents of a quasi-orthodox line (somewhat similar to the IMF's)
were perceived to be allying themselves with the IMF rather than
negotiating with it or seeking to convince their colleagues by
33reasoned argument;
c. the IMF proposals at a stage when they were presumptively still 
negotiable were presented to the President as if they were a 
"final offer".
The 1980 programme was significantly different. In the first place it 
was negotiated after the annual budgetary, wage and price exercises 
and therefore could hardly be seen to be causing major policy changes. 
(Mmimum wages had been increased 40% to restore 1978 purchasing power, 
grower prices had been raised selectively to improve urban rural terms
and improve cross product rationality; the recurrent budget deficit 
had been target for a reduction of 80% to 1% of GDP). Nor did they 
include an immediate devaluation or interest rate adjustment nor any 
significant ccmmitment to dismantle price control or foreign exchange 
budgeting.
3 4The key conditions tor a three year stand by totalling SDR 195 million 
(including SDR 15 compensatory facility) were:
a. a coordinated Bank of Tanzania/IMF exchange rate study by early 
1981 leading to agreed action by mid-1981;
b. conclusion of a Bank of Tanzania interest rate review already 
scheduled by the end of 1980 with the view to raising deposit and 
lending rates (in the event by about 1%);
c. a ceiling on additional government borrowing of about SDR 200 
million and on total DCF expansion of about SDR 300 million over 
1980/81 (22.5% and 19% respectively against an implicit projected 
rate of inflation of about 20% and increase in real output of
4 to 5%) ;
d. a reduction in external commercial arrrears frcm about SDR 185 
million to about SDR 150 million over 1980/81.
3 5The programme fell apart in November for five reasons:
a. while dated frcm July, it did not become effective until October, 
creating a lag in possible resource use effects on imports, 
production, tax revenues and exports;
b. the estimate of arrears "in the pipeline" (bank credits and non 
clc commercial bills) proved seriously inaccurate;
c. the IMF/Tanzania assumption that a World Bank structural adjust­
ment credit of about SDR 80 million would be concluded and dis­
bursed in 1980/81 beginning in the last quarter of 1980 proved 
totally wrong - a much smaller credit excluding the industrial 
sector was negotiated in 1981 but drawings were negligible during 
the fiscal year;
e. in terms of actual 1980/81 outturn, the loss of the IMF facility 
itself since import strangulation while holding down productive 
sector dcf radically reduced the revenues by forcing a fall (not 
the posited recovery) in manufactured goods output.
If the Fund and Bank finance had been available (Sh 1,550 million odd) 
transport bottleneck clearing would have allowed Sh 500 million odd 
higher exports for a net availability gain of SDR 200 million. Half
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of this would have allowed arrears to be held to target levels and the 
other would have generated tax revenues from additional imports of 
SDR 80 to 100 million, thus reducing government borrowing from SDR 300 
million to Sh 200-220 million (around the SDR 210 trigger).
Thus the programme would probably have succeeded had the projected 
Bank and Fund resources been avoidable despite several other adverse 
results:
a. the World Bank's insistence on export tax abolition which reducedOrevenue by perhaps SDR 20-25 million;
b. the collapse (unanticipated by IMF or Tanzania) of tobacco and 
coffee prices;
c. relatively poor weather affecting cotton and maize output;
d. the limited (20% in real terms) cut possible in defence and related 
expenditure because the Uganda security situation required con­
tinued involvement on a substantial scale to mid-1981 (at least six 
months later than anticipated) with a budgetary cost of perhaps 
SDR 30-40 million.
1981 negotiations toward an extended fund facility of the order of 
£400 million relatively quickly reached deadlock where they have 
remained. They took place against the background of two exchange rate 
studies (one by the Bank of Tanzania, the other by the Fund) which 
could not be reconciled.
The Tanzania study concluded that devaluation (and interest rate 
adjustment) were irrelevant to the current account balance in real terms 
as import reduction was undesirable and barriers to increasing exports, 
at least in the short and medium term, turned on quite specific bottle­
necks requiring imports to break them. It doubted the fiscal gain 
from devaluation because its analysis suggested rapid cancelling by 
inflation and a potential built-in spiral effect. Finally, it argued 
that managing devaluation would divert key personnel from more hopeful 
policy measures (related to specific resource reallocations to raise 
exports) and from actual resource and production management.
The IMF study was a superficial summary of recent events followed by a
37"standard" IMF package. Its elements appear to include:
a. a 66 2/3% to 75% devaluation;
b. 35 to 40% interest rates;
c. no increase in nominal wages or salaries;
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d. dismantling of price controls;
e. reductions in real government recurrent and capital expenditure;
f. dcf increase limits such as to require reduction in productive
sector inventaries (currently at levels totally inconsistent with 
significant output expansion);
g. 50% to 75% increases in export and 25% increases in staple food
crop grower prices (below Tanzanian estimates of the post­
devaluation inflation rate).
These features could be deduced from the initial March discussions and 
became clearer in July and Annual General Meeting dialogues. While the 
acerbic 1979 breaking of discussions has been avoided,the present 
dialogue is one of the deaf. Ironically the chief policy result of 
the IMF's proposals seems to have been to block internally proposed 
Tanzanian action to restore the mid-1980 T Shilling/SDR parity (and 
peg to the SDR) reversing the 15% odd revaluation over 1980-81 
resulting from Tanzania's dollar/pound reference basket. This technical 
adjustment would probably have been agreed on a phased basis in the 
absence of perceived IMF pressure for a much larger devaluation.
Ill
The IMF and Tanzanian Analysis/Policy Debates and Decisions
The IMF has interacted with an ongoing process of analysis, discussion, 
debate and decision in Tanzaia. It has had rather different priorities 
in respect to items on that agenda and a somewhat narrower agenda.
The most evident impact (which the author would view as a negative 
one) has been to focus a substantial amount of attention (central in 
the debate with the IMF) on devaluation and interest rates at the 
expense of more micro and structural issues.
In respect to prices, the IMF's argument that relative agricultural 
prices had over 1975-79 become radically inconsistent with output, 
equity or export criteria reinforced the position of those who pushed 
through substantial rationalisation in 1980 and 1981. For the target 
crops the increases were, if anything, above the IMF's suggested 
norms.
Subsidy elimination debate has been on timing. Tanzania was and is 
basically opposed to consumption subsidies. Those in grain arose
because bad accounting concealed the losses. The 1980 consolidation
so only one product (maize) was subsidised (partly from sugar surplus,
3 9and partly from a budgeted Treasury payment) ' and the 1981 maize price 
increase to reduce the per cent subsidy are attempts to phase out the 
subsidy (perhaps 1.5% of GDP and in respect to Treasury financed 
portion 3% of recurrent revenue). The difference is on whether it 
would be prudent to eliminate it at one go at the cost of almost 
doubling the cost of the staple urban wage good (ie, a 300% increase 
in 1981 versus the 100% actually made).
Price management (control) is an area of contention. Limiting it to 
a handleable number of basic items and improving the analysis under­
lying the acceptable return on assets given attainment of target 
levels of output/efficiency (modified cost plus) based price setting 
is agreed. However, Tanzania views price management as critical 
especially in conditions of shortage and as - to a degree - keeping 
surpluses in manufacturing, wholesaling and finance (where they can 
be taxed and are likely to be productively reinvested) opposed to 
sub-wholesaling/retailing (where neither conditions applies). The 
IMF disagrees - apparently on principle - with price management on 
the basis that free markets would work smoothly and effectively in 
Tanzania.
Industry strategy and role debate has been largely implicit. Tanzania
perceives industry as relatively integrated, relatively efficient (prior
to import strangulation) and a critical source of surplus, incentive
goods and inputs, reduction of import dependence and (less agreed
40within Tanzania) exports. As the average capacity utilisation and
profit ratios (at least to the extent determinable from Price Commission
tax and research data) of both public and private sector vary widely,
but among firms not on public/private lines and with average public
sector petormance better, most Tanzanian perceive criticism of the
public industrial enterprise role as evidencing ideological bias and
lack of actual knowledge of the sector. The IMF appear to view the
Tanzanian industrial sector as inherently weaker and featherbedded on
a fairly simplistic static comparative advantage model. It clearly
does not place equal importance on restoring capacity utilisation as
41a means to providing incentive goods or raising exports, albeit it 
does see its relevance to closing the recurrent budget deficits.
In respect to agriculture the IMF has stressed price adjustments and 
public corporation efficiency. The first is not an area of disagreement
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except that Tanzania perceives the main changes as made (urban goods/ 
rural goods terms of trade improved sharply over 1979/81/ relative 
prices among crops were rationalised). On the public corporations the 
debate is partly internal to Tanzania (with the Ministry of Agriculture 
/Marketing Development Bureau relatively unwilling to plan for or 
enforce efficiency reforms which are sought by the Treasury, central 
and commercial banks and Planning) and the World Bank/Marketing 
Development Bureau (which wish to reform by increased centralisation 
and administrative first as opposed to decentralisation and managed 
market/managerial responsibility approaches). However, Tanzania's main 
argument that the key bottlenecks are transport (fuel, spares, vehicles), 
storage, production and processing inputs and "incentive goods" which 
can only be broken by increased import capacity and whose breaking 
requires detailed micro programmes does not get much response from 
the Fund - apparently being seen as irrelevant, whereas, if correct, 
it makes much of the present devaluation/price controversy a dangerously 
attention misallocating primrose path (for both opponents and pro­
ponents) . The Fund's pressures for public enterprise reform have 
strengthened the hand of the internal advocates of reform - how much 
is unclear.
Export expansion seems to be viewed by the Fund as both necessary and 
in the short term virtually impossible. The Tanzanian debate has 
shifted radically from no active priority to export expansion 
(1961-1972) to a verbal priority not matched by action (1973-1979) to 
central priority (1980) backed by an articulated programme (1981).
The route to the NESP (National Economic Survival Programme) backed 
by articulated, aggregated export targets with ways and means hopefully 
relevant to achieving them does result from external reality forcing 
greater attention to the internal proponents of export expansion as 
vital to political economic room for manoeuvre and sustained growth 
who were as of 1969-70 an isolated minority, but by 1980 were dominant. 
The IMF has made surprisingly few proposals (beyond devaluation which 
it admits seems likely to have little impact) but the Exchange Rate 
Study by the Bank of Tanzania (required under the 1980 Letter of Intent) 
did lay the foundations for the proposals toward, dialogue on and 
adoption of the NESP. In that indirect sense,IMF intervention was 
critical but toward producing an alternative to the IMF's own adjust­
ment model, Tanzania variant.
Arrears reduction is not an area of IMF-Tanzania or intra-Tanzania
disagreement. The faster the better consistent with partial and 
sustainable restoration of real import levels is the common target and 
differences in ideas as to timing reflect optimism or pessimism (of 
authors at time of writing) not real ideological or analytical 
divergences.
The related issue of supplier credit has received surprisingly little 
Fund attention. Its use over 1979-81 to the level of perhaps SDR 200 
million largely for low foreign exchange generation, long payoff (thus 
wholly unsuitable) projects to sustain fixed investment became the 
topic of an intense (if limited circle) debate in Tanzania. 1981 saw 
new guidelines drastically limiting its use to major export develop­
ment, interim spares and replacement capital goods and final tranche
of otherwise financed bottleneck breaking projects. However, here -
40where IMF advice might have achieved an earlier correction - there 
was little Fund interest.
On uses of foreign resources - ie, reallocation from creating new,
unuseable capacity to rehabilitation and maintenance of existing
capacity, bottleneck breaking and restoration of capacity utilisation -
the IMF and Tanzania appear to have had parallel internal debates.
The preservation of gross fixed investment rates - come what may - has
had strong proponents in Tanzania4  ^ and the Fund. But in the present
crisis - if it is expected to be more than transient - maintaining
and utilising existing capacity plus selective new investment aimed
at debottlenecking, generating significant net exports or reducing
present import needs seems an improved allocation of resources. That
view came to prevail in Tanzanian (spearheaded by the Treasury) over
441979-81 and is embodied in NESP. One major obstacle (not the only 
one - domestic project defenders abound too) is that many resource 
transfers are not fungible to import support, maintenance and rehabili­
tation and selected foreign balance oriented projects. Over 1979-81 
the Fund (and Bank) have come to endorse such a reallocation of resource 
transfer use and authorisation in respect to Tanzania - possibly in 
part as a result of their dialogue with Tanzanians (who were in general 
drawn from the foreign resource reallocation proponents). They did not 
take the lead, however, as the shift began with Treasury balance of 
payments support fundraising in 1979/80.
Credit ceilings are not a matter of disagreement in principle nor 
primarily of target levels. There are disagreements on how rigid
17
targets should be if events are significantly more adverse (reducing 
government revenue and production and thereby increasing government 
borrowing) or more favourable (allowing economic expansion but requiring 
more productive sector working capital before the production/tax results 
work through to reduce government borrowing) than projected.
Given credit allocation and import constraints (particularly the latter 
in 1980/81), productive sector dcf has grown slowly (especially 
excluding a handful of disastrously run agricultural enterprises the 
need for for reforming which is common ground and, at least as to 
bank borrowing, has been begun) - well below implicit IMF or Tanzanian 
targets. But with relaxation of the import constraint,it would need 
to rise to finance inventories to allow greater production to reduce 
inflationary pressure directly and by tax revenue generation - a 
mechanism the IMF missions accept in principle but not, it would seem, 
in trigger clause forging.
In respect to the government deficit the first divergence is in
definition. Tanzania (unlike the Fund) sees a sharp difference
between the recurrent budget deficit and the public sector investment
borrowing requirement which - so long as financed from long term
sources or within an overall ceiling on dcf consistent with economic
balance - it sees as no more a deficit than - say - IBM's external
borrowing requirement. In respect to the recurrent budget Tanzania
(and to a degree the Fund) sees the only route to regain balance
45(1961/62 - 1977/78 say no recurrent deficits ) as restoring manufac­
tured goods production and therefore sales and company tax with 
secondary gains by phasing down defence and defence related costs now 
that the Uganda support operation is concluded (real defence/defence 
related spending has been cut in 1980/81 and 1981/82). There is 
equally no divergence that maintenance and repair expenditure need to 
be raised. Where there is a divergence (both Fund/Tanzania and 
within Tanzania) is on what savings, if any, on real recurrent expendi­
ture are obtainable. The Treasury - while forceful in imposing tighter 
micro-control - doubts that these can be significant given real cuts 
already made, the price uncertainties leading to supplementary estimates 
globally (usually above Tanzania's 4-6% average in non-defence spen­
ding) , and the well known difficulties in collecting enough candle 
ends to have a macro impact. The Bank of Tanzania and Planning (whose 
capital budgets' average cost overrun per project of over 25% may offer 
greater scope for real savings) are more optimistic as to the potential.
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The Fund apparently is advocating programme cuts, but barring reduction 
of services supporting directly productive sectors, the only candidates 
large enough to have a macro impact would appear to be education, 
health and water. While Tanzania has accepted curtailed growth (and 
some real per capita cuts) in these sectors major cuts are as incon­
sistent with Government, Party and public priorities as to be virtually 
inconceivable.^
Devaluation has become a central focus of disagreement - probably out 
of any relation to its possible uses in any stabilisation and recon­
struction programme. The Fund accepts that its short-term impact 
on the external balance (in foreign currency terms) would be near nil, 
its impact on inflation substantial (albeit less than Tanzanian analysis 
suggests and - apparently - as self-limiting which is contrary to 
Tanzanian evaluation of probabilities), and its effect on income dis­
tribution substantial, inegalitarian and uncertain. It contends it 
would allow substantial relative price adjustments consistent with 
enhanced government revenue/expenditure balance (which Tanzanian 
calculations suggest is highly doubtful) and improved agricultural 
enterprise surplus (which Tanzania sees as simplistic - unecessary in 
several cases, eg. coffee, cashew and hopelessly insufficient in others, 
eg. tea, tobacco, cotton). However, it is difficult to escape feeling 
the basic thrust is moral - "devaluation is good for your soul".
Tanzanian positions are split. A minority view favours a back end 
loaded (ie. lagging supply promoting measures to limit inflationary 
impact), phased (to make each step marginal limiting adverse unexpected 
consequences on prices or income distribution and to restore the 
1967-75 position when small devaluations were seen as one among many 
policy instruments) and limited (reversal of 1980-81 de facto revalua­
tion followed by reevaluation of position). The dominant position 
views large devaluations as inequitable, leading to uncontrollable 
inflationary spirals and - for both reasons - reducing or destroying
the efficiency of economic planning and management. It too tends, in
4 7the end, to make the issue a moral one of good and evil.
The impact of Fund pressure for massive devaluation on Tanzanian debate 
is clear. It has cut the ground from under the feet of those proposing 
lagged, phased, limited devaluation and prevented rational consideration 
of devaluation as one policy instrument among many.
On wages and salaries the Fund clearly believes a greater re­
duction to be desirable than most Tanzanian opinion (spearheaded 
by State House and - surprisingly - The Treasury) consider 
economically efficient, political economically wise or morally 
acceptable. Tanzania has compressed real minimum wages about 
25-30% since 1973 and real salaries by over 50% and believes serious 
personal hardship and productive inefficiency in the former case 
and further aggravation of morale (and consequentially production) 
as well as corruption (and consequentially resource misallocation) 
problems would flow from further sharp reductions (eg a wage 
freeze accompanying a large devaluation and its consequential 
inflation). Neither side appears to have convinced the other - 
1980 and 1981 minimum wage and grower price changes were designed 
to protect real purchasing power and 1981 salary increases (the 
first since 1974 and the second since before Independence) were a 
partial offsetting of 1980/81 inflation impact on real salaries.
Interest rate dialogue appears to have been theoretical/ideological
on the Fund side (moving to a 5% real interest rate at once
stance) and structural/pragmatic on the Tanzanian. Given credit
budgeting,it is doubtful allocation by use would change much.
Given the actual holders of deposits in Tanzania and their past
non-responsiveness to interest rate changes (admittedly relatively
small ones) there is no real reason to suppose much higher rates
48would increase savings. But the Tanzanian side perceives large
increases as having a major inflationary impact as they would fall
on domestic trade (raising consumer prices) and export marketing
(creating deficits for them unless - as neither the IMF nor Tanzania
proposes - grower prices were reduced). Much Tanzanian opinion
sees the solution in reducing inflation so that the 9-12% nominal
short term rates became positive in real terms (or until a limited
adjustment could make them so) and perhaps raising long term (fixed
investment financing) rates to say 12-15%. A harder line sees
any increase as both inflationary and negative in income distribution
implications (a point which is somewhat obscure given actual deposit
holders, pension and insurance beneficiaries, interest payers
49and financial institution ownership by the state).
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That there is a need to adjust whatever the balance of external and 
internal causes of the crisis if (as in now agreed) there has been 
a structural worsening of the external balance position which 
external events (eg a beverage price loan) cannot be expected to 
reverse speedily and sustainably is agreed. On the Tanzanian side 
this is a change in the sense that over 1974-76 the permanence 
of the shift was not fully recognised and in 1977-78 the temporary 
relaxation of external constraints caused by the beverage boom was 
not seen as transient so that its potential for winning structural 
improvements by concentrating on new export potential was frittered 
away (partly through IMF pushed import liberalisation). But the 
IMF appears to view the route as primarily bridging finance to 
ease demand contraction and Tanzania as primarily bridging finance 
to allow supply expansion with priority attention to export supply 
via rehabilitation and new exports (eg pulp and paper, amonia-urea, 
processed forms of existing primary exports such as shoes, twine, 
speciality textile prints, manufactures more generally).
Nor is there real divergence on the need for austerity - Tanzania's
1979-81 programme (arguably precisely because of the absence of IMF 
support) has been harsh in the extreme with real government spending - 
excluding debt service and funding past parastatal deficits - 
real wages and salaries, real imports and real availability of 
manufactured goods (except agricultural inputs) all sharply 
compressed. The differences are on who should bear the costs of 
adjustment and receive the gains of recovery (crudely put private 
capitalists or workers, peasants and enterprises 'owned' by them 
through the state) and whether a sustained recovery to a growth rate 
consistent with development is a day dream (apparent IMF view - which 
on global projections may be analytically valid) or essential to 
maintain support for and implementation of any programme (Tanzanian 
position whose psychological and political economic force is sub­
stantial) .
The basic differences between Tanzanian and IMF perceptions are 
five fold:
a. whether the present imbalances came largely from artificial 
monetary expansion of demand (implicit IMF position) or a 
fall in real supply triggered by external shocks;
b. therefore, what the cumulative and sustainable as well as
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the short term result of more import capacity (by IMF facilities ) 
would be (Tanzania seeing much more scope for internal and to a 
degree export rebalancing triggered by such an injection);
c. and whether the balance of emphasis should be as domestic
50demand compression (IMF) or domestic supply enhancement 
with a bias toward exportables (Tanzania);
d. combined with a parallel difference in perspective as to the 
general and contextual merits of 'free' versus 'managed' 
markets;
e. and a sharp difference in balance of emphasis on macro, 
standard model elements (IMF stress) versus micro, articulated, 
structural context based approaches (Tanzanian approach).
Technical debate on trigger targets has turned on three points:
a. what are appropriate quarterly ceilings given the sharp - but 
not very stable - quarterly variations in foreign exchange and 
government account balance and commercial credit requirements 
over the fiscal year?
b. are official (and publicly known) government, foreign exchange, 
and credit budget . Estimates appropriate 'trigger' levels 
and if not what margin should be allowed?
c. given external uncertainties aid data weaknesses,do precise 
figure 'triggers' (as opposed to ranges) make sense and should 
certain alterations be allowed quasi automatically if external 
events are very different from agreed Fund/Tanzania projections?
These are not per se issues of principle but in practice they are 
critical to the sustainability of any programme. The remarkably 
high mortality rate of 1979-81 multi year facility programmes 
suggests present Fund procedures are objectively unsatisfactory 
under present conditions of stress and uncertainty.
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IV
Tanzanian and IMF Adjustment Strategies: Notes Toward Evaluation
Tanzania's structural adjustment strategy as prepared in 1981
turns on six priorities:
(a) raising domestic food production and - at least equally im­
portant - improving storage and rehabilitating transport 
to avoid further food availability and import requirement 
surge problems;
(b) developing new medium and long term export sectors 
based on present unprocessed exports (e.g. shoes), newly 
exploited renewable raw materials (e.g. pulp and paper) 
and newly discovered mineral/hydro carbon resources 
(e.g.amonia-urea);
(c) completing and initiating projects to break bottlenecks 
preventing use of existing capacity (e.g. transmission
51lines for electricity to secondary industrial centres, 
local phosphate and barley consumption to cut the import 
content of fertilizer and beer production);
(d) completing/rehabilitating productive enterprise and 
infrastructure units with significant export potential/ 
impact (e.g. Morogoro shoe plant, khanga and kitenge 
textile production, main rail lines and lorry fleet);
(e) raising existing primary product and manufactured goods 
exports through loosening production (e.g. input), 
procurement (as storage transport), processing (e.g. 
spares) and shipping (e.g. transport) constraints;
(f) restoring domestic manufactured goods output by making 
additional imported inputs/spares available and plant 
rehabilitation (e.g. textiles, sugar) to make incentive 
goods more available, reduce inflationary pressure and 
"parallel market allocation" of surpluses to untaxable 
recipients unlikely to use them for productive investment 
and - through sales and company tax boosts - restore the 
recurrent budget to balance.
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These priorities - of which the fifth was seen as the most 
urgent in the short run (and the one most workable until 
additional foreign exchange was either raised from abroad 
or from its own success to implement the others) - imply 
a shift away from generalised fixed investment promotion.
(It is no accident that in real terms 1981/82 Capital 
Budget estimates were 20-25% below 1980/81.) The shift 
required is not, however, to consumption but to maintenance, 
rehabilitation, working capital (inputs to allow higher 
capacity utilisation) and selective fixed investment.
Elaboration of means to achieve these "operational goals"
was perceived as necessarily starting at the micro or
sectoral level with macro requirements aggregated upward,
e.g. the discovery that for many manufacturing firms experts
at world prices would be profitable (i.e. above incremental
cost) and were prevented by imported input constraints led
to a column in the foreign exchange budget for import
allocations tied to export targets and performance. Simple
higher allocations to potential exporters was not seen as
viable because while export sales from additional output
would be profitable additional domestic sales would be 
52more so.
In a majority of cases quite specific constraints and
53opportunities were identifiable. These varied from case
to case but imported raw material and spares availability
5 4(and/or failure to develop local alternatives ), fuel and 
power network gaps, transport availability were the commonest. 
Cost reduction also appeared to require case by case 
approaches - raising output to spread overheads was in the bulk 
of cases the most logical approach and in many almost "all" 
that was needed. Where serious internal inefficiencies 
existed,these required enterprise changes (in extreme cases 
like NMC total institutional restructuring) not particularly 
related to macro instruments like devaluation or interest
rates. Certain difficult cases - e.g. cotton, tobacco 
and tea - faced serious technical agronomic (especially 
cotton), sustainability (cotton and - because of fuel 
requirements - tobacco), and/or dismal real global price 
trend (tea and probably tobacco) problems. These problems 
seem to require specific measures (e.g. reduction of 
acidity in cotton soils, woodlots or substitution of 
coal for tobacco), cutbacks in production support 
overheads (especially for tea) and interim subsidies 
either during restoration or phasing out. Macro demand 
management and price level measures are either irrelevant 
or expensive ways of approaching such problems.
The NESP has improved efficiency of resource allocations 
to these priorities. It has had some results e.g. improved 
production, procurement, processing and transport of exports 
which appear to account for much of 1981's substantial 
export increase. However, it is clearly operating within 
too tight real resource (and especially import) constraints 
and requires an injection of new resources to produce 
results (including reducing external imbalance, clearing 
arrears and maintaining debt service) over an acceptable 
time period.
Evaluation on Uniform Criteria
Because there is not and has not for any period long enough 
to analyse been a Tanzanian programme within the parameters 
of a Fund high conditionality extention of facilities, the 
evaluation is necessarily somewhat speculative and centres 
on the Tanzanian NESP and - where it appears clearly divergent 
from fund advice - contrasts with IMF proposals.
55Micro economic efficiency clearly is central to the 
NESP1s approach (rather more in a sense than to the overly 
macro concentration and somewhat blind faith in market 
efficiency under conditions of extreme scarcity and
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uncertainty proposals of the Fund). It has been reflected 
both in the 1980-81 rationalisation of agricultural prices 
and in the actual operation of the Prices Commission.
Whether there is an egalitarianism/growth trade-off in the 
present Tanzanian context is open to question. Arguably more 
food, incentive goods and basic services (especially pure 
water, health facilities, education) for low income workers 
and peasants and, given resource scaracity, continued 
constraint on middle and upper incomes has in this context 
a positive link to growth.
The consumption/growth trade off has certainly been pushed 
heavily to the growth (investment) side by Tanzania. The 
NESP change is in stressing working capital, maintenance, 
rehabilitation and debottlenecking (including above all 
raising exports) and improved capacity utilisation in 
contrast to general levels of new capacity generating 
fixed investment.
The employment/inflation trade-off is also complex. Given 
underutilisation of capacity,the most plausible route to 
restoring mid 1975/mid 1980 rates of inflation (6 to 10%) 
would appear to be increased production (through fuller 
"employment" of existing plant and labour force) not demand 
compression. In fact the latter seems more likely to 
generate sustained falls in output and hyperinflation than 
stability.
The more general problems arise in applying micro criteria. 
The first is that expanding the production frontier often 
requires imbalances, structural changes and non-marginal 
measures which do have micro efficiency costs justified by 
allowing higher levels of production even with temporarily 
reduced micro efficiency and subsequent attention to 
restoring micro efficiency. The NESP1s export development 
priority is a case in point albeit in a broad sense it is
also a move toward micro efficiency given the past
de facto bias against them. Similarly total institutional
reconstruction (as needed in the National Milling case)
has interim micro costs but may be necessary both for
macro gains and for creating a context in which significant
micro gains are possible and sustainable. Second there
is a time frame problem. For example, few production
diversification (especially industrial sector creation)
patterns have been micro efficient at the start. In
retrospect successful ones have clearly been micro and
macro efficient over the longer term. Much of the debate
on Tanzanian industry does turn on this point. Third for
micro efficiency purposes account must be taken of
alternative uses, actual scarce resource requirements and
market prices rigidity not only of market price profit and
loss results. Failure to do so can lead to generalised 
5 6recommendations to shift from domestic food production 
to massive increases in coffee, tea and cocoa production 
on asserted static comparative advantage and (preshift) 
terms of trade projections - a prescription more likely 
to accelerate starvation than development if it leads to 
action by a majority of Sub-Saharan African economies.
57High priority to avoiding inflation is a Tanzanian goal - 
indeed much of the opposition to a front ended loaded, 
massive devaluation turns precisely on this point. The 
NESP strategy seeks to reduce excess demand by reactivating 
capacity to increase supply ( and at the same time balance 
the recurrent budget through revenue increases) and as a 
necessary facilitating measure to increase exports to loosen 
operating input stragulation of production.
The desire to achieve the reduction rapidly underlies both 
the objection to a large devaluation which would raise and 
lengthen the 1980-81 period of high (30% odd) inflation and
5 8build in expectations inconsistent with regaining stability
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and the attempt to shift existing foreign resource transfers 
to maintenance, rehabilitation and operating input uses.
Tanzanian managers, officials and technocratic decision
59takers have an additional objection to high inflation.
In the context of managed market economic policy instruments, 
lagged and uncertain data and no capacity to run detailed, 
generalised material balances checks,inflation has serious 
macro and micro policy efficiency costs because decision 
takers (presumably in the private as well as the public 
sector)do not know where they are.
6 0To seek to avoid major departures from internal balance 
in the Tanzanian context means attempting to reduce present 
imbalances rapidly. To do so by compressing demand further 
in the context of underutilised capacity is self evidently
wasteful as a general approach. Systematic debottlenecking
\and capacity utilisation restoration (a la NESP) would seem 
more efficient. Balance restoration seems unlikely to 
be facilitated by major initial cost raising shocks - thus 
the argument for delayed and phased exchange rate and 
interest rate adjustments. Whether the NESP targets are 
sustainable in the absence of "front end loaded" or "bridging" 
additions to external resource transfers is, however, open 
to grave doubt as such transfers are critical to rapid 
reduction of inflation and to sustained export growth as 
well as to restored manufactured goods production and 
recurrent budget balance.
External balance as a high priority but medium term objective^^ 
is again a priority within the Tanzanian adjustment strategy. 
Whether it is - or can be given the IMF programme and drawing 
repayment schedule constraints - for the Fund is open to some 
doubt, ie. three years is not medium term for the forty or fifty 
odd economies with external imbalances as severe as Tanzania's.
Given the present import strangulation (which in 1980 
was feeding on itself by cutting export production/processing/ 
transport) no gains can be seen from further absolute import 
reduction - au contraire. The focus in the short run 
run needs to be - and is - on restoring exports (25% below 
peak levels in physical terms in 1980) and carrying out those 
import substitution possibilities with low import content and 
guide results (e.g. barley growing?). In the medium term 
investment in new exports (including processing of existing 
ones and pushing the manufacturing sector to a ratio of 
exports to output much nearer to operating import require­
ments) and of selective import substitution (especially 
backward integration to intermediate goods and raw materials 
and lateral to spares and construction inputs) requires 
sustaining current attention and more articulated and numerous 
priorities for specific products and plants.
The main NESP-IMF divergence is on the relative weights
to be given to specific, contextual, micro measures (often
physical and requiring either non market or market intervention
based allocation) and to macro, "free play of market forces"
oriented measures. Especially in the short term the weight 
6 2of evidence appears to be on the side of the Exchange 
Rate Study/NESP approach.
Influence, Impact and Results
IMF influence on Tanzanian action has, to date, been fairly modest. 
Direct impact has, arguably, been negative and indirect somewhat 
hard to measure and weigh up.
Positive direct influence since 1974-76 has been limited to under­
lining (in 1979-81) how serious Tanzania's external balance and 
domestic surplus flow position was and was likely to remain and, 
marginally, strengthening the position of advocates of certain 
subsidy reducing or surplus enhancing measures, whether these were 
those proposed by the IMF or alternatives to them. In 1974/75, 
however, IMF resource transfers were essential to allowing Tanzania 
to hold out until other, very lagged, transfers actually arrived.
Negative direct influence has had two main aspects. First the 
1977-78 general import liberalisation which wasted resources 
(especially since, predictably, it could not be put into reverse 
rapidly) and bolstered Tanzania's erroneous perception that the 
1976-77 external balance recovery was based on something more stable 
than the 1975 Brazilian frost. Second, the 1979-81 calls for major 
interest rate boosts and devaluations have made rational discussion 
of these policy instruments in Tanzania almost impossible and 
totally blocked the Tanzanian proponents of their use on a smaller 
scale and over a different time frame as supportive instruments 
within Tanzanian economic survival strategy.
The indirect positive influence centers on the 1981 Exchange Rate
Study. Work done in connection with it did provide the base from
which the NESP - the first coherent, comprehensive, medium term 
6 3response to the 1978-?? crisis - was built. While this was hardly
the IMF's intent, it is a fact that without its pressure there would 
have been no Exchange Rate Study and - at least in 1981 - no NESP.
Indirect negative impact includes very high 1979-81 allocations of 
analytical, professional and decision taken time to working and 
negotiating with the IMF for no very evident results when if devoted 
in 1979 to elaborating an NESP and in 1980-81 to implementing it 
there would have been at least some payoff. Further IMF disagreement 
has hampered Tanzania attempts to fund alternative approaches (over
1974-76 IMF "approval" may have had a positive effect).
Impact flows from influence. The IMF facilities of 1974-75 were 
crucial to allowing the success (for 1974-77 not invalidated by 
an overestimation of how stable it was and a resultant failure to 
capitalize on it in 1977-78) of the 1974-76 adjustment strategy. 
Equally denial of substantial resources over 1979-81 has made 
attempts to devise and implement any stabilisation and structural 
adjustment strategy more costly and less successful.
The 1980 agreement breakdown had a particularly high cost. The 
year's foreign exchange and revenue budgets were drawn up assuming 
both the IMF drawings and World Bank structural adjustment credit.
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As a result, second half 1980 foreign exchange allocations were 
made at levels which - when neither flow materialised - both added 
to arrears and forced draconic cutbacks in first half 1981 
allocations below what would have been possible had the whole year's 
budget been made on the basis of funds available excluding those 
two items.
These measures of impact do not relate to the particular IMF targets
in actual, suspended and debated programmes with Tanzania. The
trigger clause figures are tests of means not of ends (eg. external
balance, internal balance, capacity utilisation, growth, income 
6 4distribution). Nor would it be valid to treat the costs of
6 5adjustment as the impact of the IMF - for two reasons. In
1974-76, the causes of adjustment costs were primarily drought and 
fuel price increases and secondarily increases in other import 
prices while the IMF facilities by providing bridging finance 
allowed much less draconic impact, production and public service 
compression in 1974-75 and (therefore) a much prompter recovery in
1975-76 than would have been possible without them.
In 1979-81 the primary causes are again external and the secondary 
largely*domestic inefficiencies caused by attempting to manage 
within radically reduced real resource parameters. These have 
been exacerbated not by IMF imposed measures or IMF funding but by 
inability to negotiate IMF facilities on terms Tanzania considers 
consistent either with economic stabilisation or adjustment leading 
to renewed development. As the present Finance Minister has 
observed, it is bitterly ironic that failure to agree to IMF 
proposals for demand compression because of commitment to supply 
expansion is forcing Tanzania to undertake even more draconic 
initial demand compression in order to free at least some real 
resources for supply (especially export supply) bolstering - an 
exercise which is both high cost and high risk.
Whether the "post IMF" situation is better or worse than it would
6 6have been in the absence of IMF programme/transfers is answerable 
only for 1974-76. For that period it is clearly better. Equally 
for that period no better strategy was evident to Tanzania (the 
internal opponents of the actual strategy in fact advocated a classic 
IMF demand compression strategy as a response to drought) then nor
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is it now to the author looking back. The failure to move more
promptly on reducing import intensity in manufacturing and on
articulating means to raising exports were deviations from the
strategy, not components in it, and were certainly not the result
of IMF influence. Without the IMF facility that strategy would
not have been viable (ie P better than C 2 in terms of Professor
6 7Williamson's comparison model ).
Over 1979-81 P does not exist in the sense that there have been no 
significant IMF transfers, therefore one is in one sense still at 
"A" - the pre IMF state of affairs - or, more realistically, at C2 
given the radical initial demand compression and policy instrument 
reshaping of 1977-80 and the new strategic formulation in NESP of 
1981.
*The question then is whether C2 (ie. with IMF facilities) would be*better than the present and better than P (the results of the*programme proposed by the IMF). C2 would include:
a) the NESP strategy elements outlined above;
b) continued price management to ensure that reductions in excess
demand pressure did lead to reductions in effective prices;
c) rehabilitation and consolidation of basic services and their 
gradual expansion;
d) a more flexible approach to bank working capital lending linked
to expansion of production and therefore need for inventories;
e) "rear end loaded", phased and probably relatively limited 
exchange and interestrate adjustments following supply boosting 
to avert generating new inflationary pressures or massive
shock effects but over time increasing freedom to manoeuvre 
on relative prices and reducing the pressures on the foreign 
exchange and credit budgets;
f) maintenance - and subsequent restoration - of real wages and 
real peasant incomes and - once recovery has become rooted - 
some restoration of real salary levels.
The author's belief that this strategic package would have more
positive external and internal balance results (as well as
production and income distribution impact) in Tanzania than the
IMF proposals is presumably evident and is - or is not - convincing
on the basis of the whole previous line of argument which obviates
6 8both the need for and value of any closing peroration.
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However, it may be worth pointing out that the external and material
(if not necessarily the political economic goal and policy) contexts
of Tanzania are similar to those of many other low income economies,
especially,but not solely#in Sub-Saharan Africa. If the criticisms
of IMF proposals and approaches in respect of Tanzania are valid in
69that case they probably (as the author has argued elsewhere ) are 
more generally relevant.
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IMF Conditionality/Tanzania Case Study 
ADDENDUM
Tanzania acted on the pending proposals to reverse its de facto 
revaluation and to alter its currency basket on March 8th, 1982. 
The 10% devaluation rolled back at least two thirds of the
1980-82 revaluation resulting fran a limited basket peg biased 
to the dollar while the basket repacking reduced the dollar's 
weight. These steps - probably delayed from June or September 
1981 by Tanzanian reaction to IMF pressure for a massive 
devaluation - appear to represent a return to the 1967-1975 
policy of modest exchange rate changes used to provide one 
input into a package of basically domestic balance adjustment 
measures.
TABLE 1
Balntice of Payments: Trade Balance
in Goods and Services: 1965 - 1980
1







Col. 4 as % of 
Current GDP
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(Col. 4 + Col. 5) 








1965 1,475.9 1 410.0 65.9 - 1.07 —
1966 1,889.9 1,694.9 195.0 -72.9 2.77 1.73
196 7 1,796.9 1,637.6 159.0 - 2.15 1i -
1968 1,719.0 1,833.7 -114.7 - -1.45 -
1969 1,756.5 1,710.1 46.4 177.3 .55 2.67
1970 1,797.2 2,274.2 -477.0 225.9 -5.21 -2.74
1971 1,913.1 2,725.6 -812.5 208.8 -8.11 -6.03
1972 2,312.7 2,882.9 -570.2 256.0 -9.99 -3.7
1973 2,581.1 3,478.9 -897.7 190.1 -6.85 -5.4
19 7 A 2,878.1 5,377.0 -2,498.9 • 181.7 -15.6 -14.49
1975 2,764 .0 5,709.4 -2,945.4 480.9 -15.49 -12.96
1976 A,108.0 5,349.5 -1,241.5 466.4 -5.3 -3.3
1977 A ,464.2 6,161.3 -1,697.1 155.7 -5.8 -5.2
1978 3,670.. 6 8,797.7 -5,127.1 210.1 -15.3 -14.72
1979 4,484.3 9,073.2 -4,583.9 306.0 -12.2 -11.37
1980 * 4.702.2 10,261.9 -5,559.7 156.1 -15.6 -15.1
Souicc. Bank of lany.auia, Economic and Operations Reports various issues, National Accounts, various 
issues; Green et al (1980).
* Revised estimates
TABLE 2
Public Finance/Gross Domestic Product Ratios 1961-1980
(stated as % of GDP) 
1960/61 1963/64 1966/67
Recurrent Revenue 13.0 3 14. 2 15. 5
Recurrent Expenditure 13.6 13.7 15. 5
Capital Expenditure 2. 6 2.9 4.5
Total Expenditure 16. 2 16.6 20.0
1969/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80
20. 1 22. 8 20.9 21.7 21.6 22.6
19.5 21.1 19.8 19.8 26.0 27. 5
7.8 7.0 12.0 11.8 15. 1 15.8
27 .3 28.1 31.8 31.6 41.1 43.3
Notes
1. Includes Debt Service in full. Technically debt redemption should not be included.
2. ’On budget' items only.
3. Excludes Colonial Welfare and Development Payments.
Sources
Adapted from "Twenty Year Review" Annex Tables on Gross Domestic Product and Trends in Government Finances; 
Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates (various years); World Bank, The Economic Development of Tanganika.
TABLE 3
Makeup of Recurrent Revenue 1961-80
(in Percentages)
1960/61 1963/64 1966/67 1969/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/78 1973/79 1979/80
Major Direct Taxes 0 \ 22.5 26.5 25.5 24.5 39- 35 5 30 37
Income (20; (20) (23) (2-2.5) (22) (35) (27.5) (23) (31)
Export (1 ) (2.5) ( 4) ( 3 ) (2.5) (4) ( 9 ) ( 7) ( 6)
Major Indirect Taxes 44.5 40 41 46- 38- 53 51.5 53 50
Customs and Excise1 (44.5) (40) (41) (33.5) (24*5) (17.5) (21) (16) (15)
Sales Tax on Domestic Goods ( 0 ) ( 0) ( 0) (12.5) (13.5) (35.5) (30.5) (37) (35)
Parastatal Dividends 0 • 0 1 3 3 2 2 3 3
Other Sources 34.5 37.5 31.5 25.5 37.5 6 10 14 10
Total 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100




Includes Sales Tax on Imports. Excise amalgameted into Sales 
Thx 1977/78 - 1972/79.
Import and Export Duties plus Sales Tax on Imports.
As For Table 2»
Ann!yenR nf Budgetary Financing Reguirenent 1963/64 - 1979/80
(In £)
TABLE 4
Ratios To GDP 196 3/6A 1966/67 1969/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/78 1976/79 1979/80
Capital Budget 2.9 4.5 7.8 7.0 12.0 11.0 15.1 15.8
Plus Recurrent Budget Deficit 




2.4 4.5 7.2 5.3 10.9 9.9 19.5 20.8
1.0 1.9 1.6 3.3 5.5 4.2 8.0 10.5
1:4 2:6 5:6- 2;0 5.4 5.7 11:5 10.3•zGrants/Tiransfers/ etb. (1.4) (2.6) (0;7) (o¿ 2) (0.5) (0i5) (0.4) (0.3)
Non-Bank Borrowing ( - ) ( - ) (2¿2) (1¿8) (1í8) (2.5) (1.4) (1 ¿4)
Bank Borrowing ( - ) ( - ) (2.7) (O.O) (3.1) (2.0) (9.7) (8.6)
Ratios to Financing Requirement
External Finance 39 43 •22 63 50 42 41 51
Bank Borrowing - - 38 1 28 19 49 41
Ratios to Chpital Budget
External Finance 33 43 20 47 45 36 54 67
Notes:
1. Includes grants, loans to governnent. Sone snail private agency grantis nay be nisclassified under donostic. Includes
counterpart Funds iron food aid and. balance of payments support finance in year' paid into Development Revenue account.
2. Excludes domestic counterpart funds fron external aid (see Note 1).
3. Early year figures appear to include sone borrowing eg fron Cotton Authority, East African Currency Board. Later years 
include resources from special Funds in year allocated/paid over to Development Revenue.
Sources: Adopted from "Twenty Year Review" Annex Tables on Public Finance, GDP; Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates 
(various years)
TABLE 5





1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1975/79* 1979/8O*
1* Tax Revenue 10 17.2 2937.8 3160.6 3302.5 4672.0 5M3.0 5854.0 6154.0
2, Other Revenues 6.8 85.2 781.7 616.0 607.0 748.1 830.0 1116.0
3* Total Recurrent Revenue 1024.0 3023.0 3942.3 3918.5 5279.0 6091.1 6684.0 7270.0
4* Recurrent Expenditure 979.7 2785.O 3961.1 3715.6 5108.0 5769.0 1 8907.0 9094.0
5 • Surplus 44.3 238.0 -18.8 202.9 171.0 322.1 -2223.0 -1824.0
6* Development Expenditure Financed by: 294.4 1442.0 2221.2 2253.0 2731.0 3388.0 4771.0 4800.0
a. Surplus on Recurrent Budget 44.3 238.0 -18.8 209.9 171.0 322.1 -2223.0 -I824.O
b. Non—Bank borrowing 59.8 196.0 362.0 336.0 276.0 488.0 569.0 443.0
c. Borrowing from Banks 18„9 521.0 834.0 570.0 -I7O .5 464.O 2912.5 2802.1
d« Other Sources 44.4 6.0 6.0 113.1 1052.3 744.9 IO85.I 778.9
e. External Loan*i and Grants 127.0 481.0 1038.0 1031.0 1402.0 1369.0 2427.O 2600.0
* Provisional
Source: Economic Survey (Various issues) and Budget Documents
TABLE 6
Gross Bank Lending 1966 - 1979*







1966 72.5 93,0 170,5 806.5
1968 64.9 80.1 145-0 819.8
1969 75.6 168.3 243.9 964.1
1970 291.3 164.7 456.0 1141.3
1973 484.9 558-6 IO43.5 1566.9
1974 863.3 671.2 1334.5 2456.4
1976 1477.2 1895.1 3372.3 3513.6
1977 1445.6 1878.7 3324.3 3847.7
1978 2041.3 1898 .2 3939.5 5153.1
1979 4515.6 2589.3 7104.9 6418.2
* The 
Source:
fijares are given in quarterly avc 
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aNotes
1. Dr.Green is a Professorial Fellow of the Institute of Development 
Studies at the University of Sussex. He has been associated 
with two of the studies on the adjustment process carried out by 
UNCTAD for the Group of 24 under the leadership of Sidney Dell 
and with the 1980 Arusha Conference on the International Monetary 
System. Over 1966-1974 he was Economic Advisor to the Tanzania 
Treasury and from 1980 to date has been half time advisor to the 
Tanzanian Treasury, Central Bank and Ministry of Planning. The 
views expressed and suggestions made are his personal respon­
sibility and are not necessarily those of any Tanzanian institution. 
While he has been involved in Tanzanian negotiations with the IMF 
and the 1981 Bank of Tanzania Exchange Rate Study, this paper does 
not use information considered confidential by Tanzania - equally 
in no case does it present data or interpretation inconsistent 
with such information.
2. The background to 1974-81 is presented in much greater detail 
in: B.Mwansasu and C.Pratt, Towards Socialism in Tanzania, 
University of Toronto/Tanzania Publish House, Toronto/ Dar -es 
Salaam, 1979, and R.H.Green, D.Rwegasira and B.Van Arkadie,
Economic Shocks and National Policy Making: Tanzania in the
1970s, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague,Research Report No.8 
1981. The latter presents a summary, interpretation and evaluation 
of 1974-78 adjustment as (from a different point of view) does
R.Liebenthal, Adjustment in Low Income Africa, 1974-78, World 
Bank, 1981, pp. 29-39. More recent data and evaluation are drawn 
from Bank of Tanzania, Exchange Rate Study, 1981, mimeo (editors 
D.Rwegasira and R.H.Green) and Bank of Tanzania, 20 Year 
Political Economic Review 1961-1981 (in press - title tentative - 
relevant chapters largely by Van Arkadie, Green, Kamori,Rwegasira 
and Mwansasu).
3. Over 1972-75 up to two thirds of aid was Chinese (of which over a 
quarter was de facto balance of payments support) whereas after 
1976 this flow was minimal. DAC members and multilateral and 
resource transfers per capita have risen significantly since 1975.
4. Of this the post liberation costs total over $250 million, those 
of the war period over $400 million plus $100 million adjustment/ 
demobilisation costs. Of this of the order of $150 million 
represents loans in principle recoverable from Uganda but in 
practice beyond Uganda's present and foreseeable capacity to repay.
5. Abnormal levels of stocks held by crop authorities were of the 
order of 20% of exports while those not purchased (especially 
but not solely cotton) were at least of the order of 5 to 10%.
Pre-1967 strategy was less coherent because it included growing 
commitment to the goals outlined below but without even potentially 
appropriate instruments. In practive it was a mise en valeur, 
private production/state intrafstructure led approach marked by 
growing inequality and a desired dependence on private/public 
capital inflow which was not attainable in the 1961-67 context.
See Mwansasu and Pratt and Bank of Tanzania "20 Year Review", 
op cit, for more detailed discussion.
As of 1961 the range was essentially staple foodstuffs (with 
an import requirement even here for wheat, sugar, rice and in 
half the years maize) and unprocessed (or minimally processed) 
agricultural experts plus uncut diamonds.
The approach is broadly similar to that of Ragnar Nurkse's 
"Istanbul Lecture".
For a concise introduction to EAC, SADCC see Africa Contemporary 
Record, Africana, New York, chapters on EAC (1975-76, 76-77,
77-78) and Southern African Economic Cooperation (1978-79,
79-80, 80-81, 81-82) by the author.
Credit and foreign exchange budgeting are intermediate cases 
as they are clearly not material balances planning -especially 
as operated - but are quite selective market management.
Target rates have usually been about 6.5% and achieved 4 to 6%.
The latter range is considered dangerously low in terms of 
strategy viability.
The macro case turns on peasant real incomes, staple food self 
sufficiency, foreign exchange earnings implying substantial 
real income and output structure (and less clearly overall output 
level shifts.
In the absence of earned foreign exchange (or reserves) in excess 
of operating requirements ex post domestic savings cannot readily 
exceed one third of gross investment because the direct and 
indirect import content of investment is of the order of two thirds
Domestic credit formation targets have been set at or below real 
output growth projections plus exogenous inflation and include 
government bank borrowing.
This figure is basically urban - the landless rural population 
is very small. Seasonal unemployment associated with rainfed 
agriculture is high albeit the increased command investment 
(buildings, public works, small scale irrigation afforestation) 
made possible by villageisation has reduced it marginally.
This is on a conversion of household produced rural housing and 










1981 - because of a record coffee crop and substantially 
increased "parallel market" food sales may be near 1977 per 
capita levels but this seems unrealistic given shortages of 
urban manufactured goods and the limited (albeit real) post 1975 
development of small rural handicraft and manufactured goods 
supply.
In two cases major action was needed to avert decline of 
previously sisal industry centred towns.
The Prices Commission is a price management body with 
guidelines relating inter alia to firm efficiency and 
surplus not a standard consumer price control body.
The World Bank (cited in Leibenthal 0£ cit) draws gloomier 
conclusions but these are open to question. The Bank of 
Tanzania "20 Year Review" and a recent Ph.D. thesis by 
J.Wagao present the case for the position stated in much 
greater detail.
For more detail see chapters by M.A.Bienefeld and R.H.Green 
in M.Fransman, Industry and Accummulation in Africa,
Heineman, 1982. The low direct import to ex factory price 
ratio in consumer manufacture is a mixed blessing in the 
context of import cutbacks - goods availability at retail 
prices falls $8 to 9, tax revenue $2 to 2.50 and domestic 
value added over $3.5 (including domestic suppliers to 
manufactures for each dollar of forced import savings on 
manufacturing sector spares and inputs.
Over the 1950s and 1960s there was usually a two year cycle.
1973 and 1974 were both bad, 1975 average, 1976-78 good,
1979-81 bad. Statistics appear as collected to damp both up and 
down swings around the 4 to 5% agricultural output growth 
trend.
This is not to argue inaction in the 1980s - the potential 
is significant and whenever begun serious efforts will not 
yield major payoffs for up to a decade.
Village operations relate primarily to investment, marketing 
and commerce with some transport and small scale 
manufacturing. 95-97% of peasant agricultural production 
is individual, not communal, a pattern unlikely to change 
rapidly, nor one in which radical, rapid change is a 
public goal.
d25. Because 1967 was the first true census and 1977 had improved 
coverage,the raw population growth figures of 2.75 per cent 
to 1967 and 3.3 per cent since are almost certainly over­
estimates .
26. This suggests a serious over-allocation of resources to 
investment in new capacity from 1979 onward - a misallocation 
supported by rigidities in use of concessional finance and 
major, unwise use of supplier credit over 1979 - first half 
1981 to sustain investment without adequate regard to forward 
foreign exchange availability/requirement implications.
27. The earlier programmes are discussed in Green et alia, op cit 
and those through 1980 in the balance of payments and 
international economic relations chapters of Bank of Tanzania 
"20 Year Review", ojd cit. An earlier discussion of the 1979 
and 1980 negotiations (before the collapse of the 1980 
programme was known) by the present author appears in 
Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs, No. 11, December 1980.
28. Discussed in depth in Green et alia, op cit.
29. In fact the beverage boom also radically increased 
government revenue and reduced net bank lending to 
government (which declined for several quarters) so 
that the ceiling might have been met because both sides' 
projections of foreign exchange earnings and tax revenues 
were too pessimistic.
30. 1974-76 had been marked by severe import compression 
(perhaps 30 to 40 per cent in relation to GDP in real 
terms). Some import relaxation was needed - and some
was begun in 1976 in respect of industrial and agricultural 
inputs and spares. The issues are that the 1977 advice 
was for import levels which could not possibly be sustained 
unless the beverage price boom was viewed as the new norm 
and across-the-board liberalisation frittered away not 
insubstantial sums on non-priority consumer goods imports.
31. The negotiations were three months before the actual end of 
the war and at a time when no projection of that period could 
be made.
32. The war costs and dislocations and import bottleneck 
constraints on output combined with the direct and indirect 
impact of petroleum price increases would appear to have 
been much more significant.
33. The issue was not fiscal austerity - 1977/78 to 1979/80 
had been the laxest budgets in Tanzanian history and the 
incoming Minister of Finance, predictably (on his record
in two previous terms at the Treasury) tightened expenditure 
control and the analysis/policy work on the 1980/81 and 
1981/82 budgets.
e34. Others were not critical eg the short term commercial 
borrowing ceiling was well above any level the Treasury 
was prepared to contemplate, neither the Treasury nor the 
Bank of Tanzania had the slightest inclination toward 
multiple exchange rates.
35. The following section is based on the 1980/81 Budget Speech 
and analysis of preliminary 1980/81 fiscal, credit and 
balance of payments outturn. It may or may not correspond 
exactly to official estimates of impact and causation.
36. The bulk of this might have been foregone for 1981/82 in any 
event because the coffee price could not otherwise have 
been held in the face of world price falls and the internal 
cash flow of the Sisal Corporation strengthened to 
facilitate rehabilitation. However, at least the coffee 
tax would not have dropped in mid year as the gain to 
growers of the 1980/81 abolition in February was on coffee 
already harvested - hardly the ideal situation for it to
be an output-boosting incentive.
37. These can be deduced from Presidential and Ministerial 
speeches from July onward and are not, in fact, discussed 
with no particular secrecy in Dar es Salaam.
38. Ironically this 'development1 over 1975-79 resulted from 
in effect entrusting them to an autonomous, technocratic 
agency and was reversed when ministers (on the urging of their 
technical advisers) reasserted control.
39. Another Treasury payment was begun to fund past losses 
related to spoilage, excessive cross transport, dumped exports, 
interest on drawings not backed by assets, horrendously low 
poultry feed prices and the previous 'accidental' grain 
subsidies (perhaps a third of the SDR 250 million total losses). 
These measures were initiated by Treasury and Planning in late 
1979 during the period between breakdown of 1979 and
opening of 1980 IMF negotiations and did not relate to IMF 
proposals or comments.
40. NESP represents a partial consensus that, given import 
allocations tied to subsequent exports,certain industries 
can generate substantial exports at prices above their 
incremental costs. The emphasis on the Moroquro shoe,
Mufindi pulp and paper and Kilwa amonia-urea plants also 
reflect a reorientation of sectoral priorities to export 
generation.
41. The IMF appears to view substantial manufactured exports 
from Tanzania as inconceivable because it is thinking of 
labour intensive (low wage export) industries rather than 
natural resource intensive and/or speciality (eg khanga 
and kitenge prints) products.
42. The unwisdom of sustaining gross fixed investment now at 
the cost of mortgaging future export earnings was fairly 
rapidly accepted once an internal analysis was done as a 
byproduct of the Exchange Rate Study.
rf
43. cf Green et_ alia, op cit for the 1974-76 strategy and results 
in this connection.
44. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, 1981 
(mimeo) and 1982(mimeo). Summarised in Minister's 1981/82 
Budget Speech and (for 1982 and 1981 performance) in Daily 
News, 23-1-82 and 10-11-82.
45. On Tanzanian accounting 1973/74 did show a recurrent deficit 
but less than debt redemption included (logically incorrectly 
even if procedurally usefully) in recurrent spending.
46. Because certain Tanzanians would find such cuts desirable - 
probably eg the airplane hijackers - but would be in a 
position to enforce them only by a coup and a highly repressive 
regime, sustained pressure for such cuts (however intended)
is perceived by many of the Tanzanian leadership as political 
interference not economic advice.
47. This pattern began during the abortive 1979 talks, receeded 
in 1980 and became much more intense from the middle of 1981.
48. It might cause some shift from currency to deposits but this 
has no macro meaning ie it alters asset holdings not savings 
rates.
49. Like devaluation, interest rate dialogue and deadlock has 
shown signs of causing some participants to abandon analysis 
and objective corrdlatives and escape to a level of good 
versus evil somewhat tenuously related to economic or political 
economic reality.
50. Including tax revenues and savings as well as - and 
generated by - increased physical production. Likewise 
including rehabilitation, maintenance and selective new 
investment as well as enhanced imported inputs into domestic 
production.
51. Substantial textile and farm implement capacity is totally 
unusable because of lack of power and at least one existing 
secondary industrial sector suffers from unreliability (and 
import cost) of its oil fired plant.
52. This is not unique to Tanzania - unit profits on domestic 
sales normally exceed those on exports. However, given the 
domestic imbalance,it is especially severe in Tanzania at 
least until external and internal balance are closer.
53. In the Exchange Rate Study and NESP technical background papers 
and consultations.
54. Performance on this front has been very uneven with the best 




55. See J. Williamson, 'On Judging the Success of IMF Policy 
Advice', pp. 10 ff.
56. As in the World Banks, Accelerated Development for Subsaharan 
Africa - An Agenda for ACTION, Washington, 1981, passim esp. 
pp. 21,6 5 .
57. Williamson, op cit, pp 12 ff.
58. Admittedly in 1974 major price and wage adjustments were 
made to pass on the world grain and oil price increases at 
once to achieve a rapid shift to a new price plateau. This 
did work - very rapid price increases in two quarters were 
followed by restoration of inflation rates under 10%. But 
in 1974 past inflation was lower, the starting points (or 
at least the 1973 past) were of internal and external 
balance and the attention mobilizeable for a coherent forward 
projection of consequences (based on statistical data much 
better than that now available) was much greater than would 
be the case in 1982. An attempt to repeat 1974 would run a 
very high risk of collapsing into hyperinflation on an enduring 
basis.
59. Additional to the case made by Williamson, op cit, on pp 15-16.
60. Williamson, op cit, pp 18 ff.
61. ibid, pp 20 ff.
62. As identified in much greater detail in the Exchange Rate
Study, NESP working papers and '20 year Review".
63. Previous action was certainly substantial but not coordinated 
and largely centered on import compression.
64. cf Williamson, op cit, p.24.
65. ibid, loc cit.
66. The two can only be evaluated ex post as a package. However, 
conceptually the transfers might produce better results if 
linked to a different programme - indeed in one sense that
is precisely Tanzania's argument.
67. cf op cit, pp 4-7.
68. Such a peroration might also cut against the aim of this 
paper to contribute to dialogue by expressing criticisms
in terms of a goal set presumably not widely divergent from 
the IMFs and doing so in terms of argument related to actual 
contextual facts and in language of reasonable civility!
69. 'Low Income Countries and the International Monetary System', 
paper for the Group of 24 Expert Group Meeting of the same 
title, New York, February 1982, publication pending. An 
earlier perspective is 'Aspects of the World monetary and 
resource transfer system in 1974: a view from the extreme 
periphery' in G:.K. Helleiner, A World Divided: the less 
developed countries in the international economy, Cambridge, 1976.
k
